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Abstract
Resilience as a concept , along with its siblings security and risk, has emerged as a crucial aspect of the tech-
nologies of contemporary governance and neoliberal rule. Building resilient persons, communities and institu-
tions is the sine qua non of twenty-first century forms of liberalism. Resilience provides an indispensable road-
map by which all of us are purportedly able to anticipate and tolerate the disturbances, dangers and radical 
contingencies of inhabiting a complex world in which, to quote the President of the Rockefeller Foundation in 
its new resilience manifesto, “we cannot predict where the next major shock to our well-being will manifest”. 
Resilience thinking has made use of, and incorporated, the notion of vulnerability developed by Hans-Georg 
Bohle and other political ecologists. But in doing so the body of work which links socio-ecological complexity, 
resilience thinking and risk management, has deprived critical political ecology (and concepts like vulner-
ability) of their critical edge. My focus will be on issues of food, famine and climate – topics of great interest to 
Hans-Georg Bohle and indeed on which he published extensively – and what resilience theory may, or may not, 
have to offer in light of the vulnerability analyses of the sort developed by Bohle and others.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Konzept der Resilienz hat sich, neben den verwandten Begriffen ‘Sicherheit’ und ‘Risiko’, zu einem der ent-
scheidenden Aspekte der Vorgehensweise gegenwärtiger Governance und neoliberaler Herrschaft entwickelt. Die 
Schaffung resilienter Personen, Gemeinschaften und Institutionen ist zu einer Conditio sine qua non des Libera-
lismus des 21. Jahrhunderts geworden. Resilienz liefert einen unverzichtbaren Fahrplan, mit Hilfe dessen wir alle 
angeblich in der Lage sind, die Störungen, Gefahren und radikalen Eventualitäten des Lebens in einer komplexen 
Welt vorherzusehen und zu ertragen, in einer Welt, um die Präsidentin der Rockefeller Foundation aus deren neu-
em Resilienz-Manifest zu zitieren, in der „wir nicht vorhersagen können, was sich als nächster größerer Schock für 
unser Wohlergehen erweist“.  Das Resilienz-Denken hat dabei Gebrauch gemacht von dem Begriff der Vulnerabili-
tät, den Hans-Georg Bohle und andere Vertreter der Politischen Ökologie entwickelt haben, und hat diesen für sich 
vereinnahmt. Aber auf diesem Weg haben die Arbeiten, die sozial-ökologische Komplexität, Resilienz-Denken und 
Risikomanagement miteinander verbinden, die Kritische Politische Ökologie (und Begriffe wie z.B. Vulnerabilität) 
ihrer kritischen Schärfe beraubt. Im Zentrum meiner Ausführungen stehen Fragen der Ernährung, des Hungers 
und des Klimawandels  –  Themen, die für Hans-Georg Bohle von großem Interesse waren und über die er umfang-
reich publizierte, und es geht um die Frage, was die Resilienz-Theorie uns anbieten kann – oder nicht anbieten 
kann – im Licht der Betrachtung der Vulnerabilitätsstudien, wie sie Bohle und andere entwickelt haben. 
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Geographies of vulnerability can … be conceived 
as complex social spaces, as geographically and 
historically speciϐic networks of entitlement and 
power relations … The geographies of vulnerabi-
lity to violence are therefore social maps that re-
present dynamic patterns of social and economic, 
political and military, institutional and cultural 
practices that are constantly adjusted and read-
justed to shifting logics of violence.
Hans-Georg Bohle, Geographies of Violence and 
Vulnerability 
The motto of neoliberalism is: Live dangerously.
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics
One of the great pleasures of working with Hans-Georg 
Bohle – I was the beneϐiciary of a sabbatical visit that 
he made to Berkeley in 1993 – is that he thought visu-
ally and pictorially. In our discussions of what distin-
guished particular forms of vulnerability among say 
rural peasantries in the Sahel or marginalized com-
munities in Sri Lanka, Hans-Georg would typically re-
sort to a picture or a sketch of a set of social relations 
or processes. He possessed the great ability to capture 
something important graphically, and indeed this was 
how our paper on vulnerability published in Progress 
in Human Geography in 1993 (Watts and Bohle 1993) 
came to take shape and substance. I am struck by the 
degree to which many of his contributions are exam-
ples of what one could call geographical pictography. 
His important article on geographies of violence in 
Erdkunde in 2007 (Bohle 2007) from which I have 
taken a quotation is a compelling case in point. Pic-
turing and representing is, of course, fundamental 
to social science and I emphasize these qualities in 
Hans-Georg’s work because it is central to the way in 
which he conceived of vulnerability in social systems, 
and I think, too, is key to how he thought conceptu-
ally, not the least of which was the linking of particu-
lar concepts and processes – for example networks 
of entitlement and power, or social maps of complex 
processes (economic, political, cultural, institution-
al) that intersect with logics of violence. In a word, I 
would say that Hans-Georg thought dialectically.
My emphasis on Bohle’s distinctive approach to vul-
nerability is related to the arc of my broad concern in 
this contribution, namely how vulnerability has since 
his writings on the topic in the early 1990s become 
attached to three other keywords – or concepts – in 
novel ways that dominate both current analytical and 
prescriptive work across many domains from global 
poverty to conϐlict to urban governance to global 
 pandemics and ϐinancial crashes: namely security, 
resilience and risk. Take for example, the new book 
by the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, Judith 
Rodin, entitled ‘The resilience dividend’. She has, ac-
cording to the blurb on the back cover, recalibrated 
the foundation to address the disruptions, shocks 
and stresses associated with our interconnected 
world. In this age of complexity, says Rodin, the abil-
ity to quickly and effectively bounce back is an urgent 
social and economic issue. The ϐive characteristics of 
resilience (Rodin 2014: 14) – awareness, diversity, in-
tegration, self-regulation and adaptiveness – provide 
the building blocks of the “adaptive cycle” – a four-
phase model integrating the ideas of Brian Holling 
(“resilience”), Jay Forrester (“systems thinking”) and 
Joseph Schumpeter (“creative destruction”). Rodin is 
of course not alone. In our times, resilience has be-
come a keyword (Williams 1985) for understanding 
the challenges of inhabiting and living with the con-
sequences of the Anthropocene (Schoon 2006). 
In this sense one might say that resilience as a con-
cept (along with its siblings security and risk) has be-
come a powerful technology of contemporary govern-
ance and neoliberal rule2. Building resilient persons, 
communities and institutions is the sine qua non of 
twenty-ϐirst century forms of liberalism. Resilience 
provides an indispensable road-map by which all of 
us are purportedly able to anticipate and tolerate the 
disturbances, dangers and radical contingencies of 
inhabiting a complex world in which, to again quote 
the President of the Rockefeller Foundation in its 
new resilience manifesto, “we cannot predict where 
the next major shock to our well-being will manifest” 
(The Rockefeller Foundation 2013: 1). The argument 
I want to make is that in incorporating vulnerability 
into what is now a rather major academic industry 
operating under the sign of socio-ecological complex-
ity, resilience thinking and risk management, much of 
the critical edge – the  dialectical quality – of Bohle’s 
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work has been lost. My focus will be on issues of 
food, famine and climate – topics of great interest 
to Hans-Georg and indeed on which he published ex-
tensively – and what resilience theory may, or may 
not, have to offer in light of the vulnerability analy-
ses of the sort developed by Bohle and others.
Thinking through resilience 
“Knowing when and how to exploit uncertainty to 
invent a new and better future is equally a promi-
nent feature of the adaptable, ϔlexible and enterpris-
ing subject of resilience” (O’Malley 2010: 505-506, 
my emphasis).
Discursively and practically, climate change repre-
sents, in today’s security argot, a planetary emergen-
cy: it encompasses, and has direct consequences for, 
two of the most basic human provisioning systems: 
food and energy. The climate-energy-food nexus 
mobilizes  powerful actors around the threat of mas-
sive, catastrophic risks and uncertainties – that is to 
say, it conϐirms and endorses the prescriptive need 
for bio security broadly construed. Central to con-
temporary iterations of security – and how concepts 
like vulnerability are deployed – is a construal of the 
nature of life itself, drawing upon the molecular and 
digital sciences, namely complexity, networks and 
information, which shapes the nature of what is to 
be governed and how (the latter, as we shall see, en-
tails a construal of both the liberal security state and 
of neoliberal political economy). If life is constituted 
through complex and continual adaptation and emer-
gence it rests upon a sense of radical uncertainty in 
which danger and security form an unstable present, 
what Dillon and Reid (2009: 85) call “the emergency 
of its emergence”, or a life “continuously becoming 
dangerous” (see also Lentsoz and Rose 2009; Collier 
2008). Ash Amin sees this as the condition of calami-
ty, or catastrophism: “The recurrence, spread, sever-
ity and mutability of the world’s natural and social 
hazards are considered as symptomatic of this state 
(of permanent risk), and its latent conditions are un-
derstood to be too volatile or random and non-linear 
to permit accurate prediction and evasive action. In 
the apocalyptic imaginary, hazard and risk erupt as 
unanticipated emergencies, disarming in every man-
ifestation and in every way” (Amin 2012: 138).
Two things can be said about this state of emergency 
(see Agamben 1998). First, while there remain impor-
tant differences across different domains of life, there 
are nevertheless close family resemblances between 
the climate change/energy/food nexus and how tra-
ditional biosecurity threats – bio-terrorism, emerging 
illnesses and trans-species epidemics – are conϐigured 
and enacted. For Melinda Cooper (2008) these common-
alities share deeper state-led entanglements that con-
ϐlate and draw together molecular research and the in-
formational sciences, speculative ϐinance and war. As a 
particular ontology, catastrophism and a life of radical 
precarity has produced a distinctive (perhaps a dis-
tinctively new) culture of risk and risk (and fear) man-
agement. This ontology is what Laurent Berlant (2007) 
calls an “actuarial imaginary”, an assemblage made up 
of the institutions, technologies, techniques and eth-
ics the goal of which is to maximize security, proϐit-
ability and well-being. These wide-ranging threats are 
potentially catastrophic, often vague and spectral but 
always promising the prospect of an imminent dis-
aster (Anderson 2010: 779-780). Climate and food for 
example are all stitched together into a new security 
fabric common to all threats and dangers, inevitably 
shaped and framed by the events of September 11th, by 
global US military mobilization, what Dillon and Reid 
(2009) call the “liberal way of war”, and the hegemony 
of the marketplace. In all such disaster talk, the threat 
is already present, an incubus that can be discerned 
and visualized through a series of signs, early warn-
ings and simulations (Anderson 2010). 
And second, if disaster is imminent it is also indetermi-
nate in a way that prioritizes what Jane Guyer (2009) 
calls the “near future”. Anticipatory actions become, 
as a result, the deϐining qualities of modern liberalism 
(everyone, Donald Rumsfeld famously said, needs to be 
proactive and not reactive, less bureaucratic and more 
like a venture capitalist). Preemption, precaution and 
preparation are its key deployments – or political tech-
nologies – through which a wide range of crises and 
challenges are to be confronted (Anderson 2010; Amin 
2012). Anderson captures the matter brilliantly: The 
question is how to protect certain forms of valued life 
that revolve around a future – always uncertain, life-
threatening and full of surprises – that diverges from 
both the past and present? What constitutes govern-
ance and action “in the here and now before the full oc-
currence of a threat or danger” (Anderson 2010: 780)? 
The securitization of life (Floyd 2010; Buzan and 
Wæver 2009) is no less visible in the policy shift from 
climate change mitigation to adaptation in responses 
to the inexorable, if unpredictable perturbations and 
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threats associated with global warming (Adger et al. 
2009; Adger 2006). In light of what is, in the short and 
medium term, an unassailable trend, the question is 
therefore how do governments, cities, societies and 
economies withstand and bounce back from the con-
sequences of climate change? How is life expected 
not only to endure but also to return to some sort of 
normality? How are forms of life expected to reset 
themselves, bouncing back into orderly patterns and 
routines? Central to the way these questions are now 
framed – and to the potentially catastrophic conse-
quences of climate change with all of its radical un-
certainties – is the notion of resilience, understood 
analytically and normatively, in relation to the new 
and perhaps unprecedented vulnerabilities of inhab-
iting the Anthropocene. Resilience’s lexicon custom-
arily encompasses process, disturbance as opportu-
nity, self-organization, adaptive capacity, acceptance 
of uncertainty, non-equilibrium dynamics, dynamic 
learning, ϐlexibility, performance and stress absorp-
tion (see Bahadur et al. 2010). 
Nowhere is this resilience talk more visible than in the 
space – both geographical and discursive – in which 
poverty in the Global South meets up with global cli-
mate change, and nowhere is this meeting point more 
salient than in sub-Saharan African and especially 
the semi-arid Sahel where survival in drought-prone 
environments is the central existential challenge. Al-
most a quarter of a billion Africans suffer from hun-
ger and malnutrition. Nobody seriously expects that 
the Millennium Development Goal (United Nations 
2012) of halving the number of hungry people be-
tween 1990 and 2015 will be met in Africa – or indeed 
globally. The incidence of famine – and famine mor-
talities – has probably declined since the 1960s, lead-
ing some like Cormac Ó’Gráda (2009: 278) in ‘Famine: 
a short history’ to refer to contemporary food crises 
as “small-scale famines”. Yet Africa, and Sahelian Af-
rica in particular, remains a striking outlier. In 2011 
some 10 million people were drawn into the clutch-
es of the terrible food crisis in Somalia, Kenya and 
Ethiopia. In 2012 the UN called for a massive food-aid 
mobilization in view of a looming subsistence crisis 
in the Sahel; according to the World Food Program 
over 8 million people will require “life-saving food 
assistance”. The Sahel, now seen geopolitically as a 
new front in the prosecution of a counter-insurgency 
against radical Islam, is one of the regions on which, 
according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the deadweight of global warming is about 
to fall. From quite different political vantage points – 
Christian Parenti (2011) from the left, United States 
Department of Defense (2011) on the right – this 
new conjuncture of violence, poverty, food shortage 
and climate change deϐines the coming apocalypse, 
the ‘tropic of chaos’ as Parenti calls it. The Sahel is a 
prime exemplar of catastrophism cutting across the 
ideological spectrum (Lilley et al. 2012).
This current Sahelian food and environmental crisis 
on its face seems to be a tragic replay of the terrible 
famines that captured the world’s headlines four dec-
ades ago. Indeed one of the signal lessons to have been 
learned from the serial failures to improve food secu-
rity and life chances in the arid-lands of West Africa, 
is that the boundary lines between mass starvation 
and the longue durée of permanent hunger and under-
nourishment are porous and ϐlimsy. Existentially, what 
we are witnessing is something close to slow death, a 
death by attrition: “The phrase slow death refers to the 
physical wearing out of a population and the deterio-
ration of people in that population that is very nearly 
a deϐining condition of their experience and historical 
existence” (Berlant 2007: 754). In the Sahel, slow death 
and the radical reduction of human existence to bare 
life (Agamben 1998) is the deepest expressions of what 
Mike Davis (2000) in ‘Late Victorian holocausts’ prop-
erly called the war over the right to existence. 
In short, in a world of new risks, uncertainties, vul-
nerabilities, turbulence and surprise, how is life to 
be made secure among some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable communities on the face of the earth? In 
place of the managed environmentalism of the 1970s 
and the neo-Malthusian models when drought was 
central to the analysis of the great Sahelian famines 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, is a new language 
turning on resiliency and adaptive community in-
stitutions linked through market governance (WRI 
2008; Gubbels 2011). Gone is the older language of 
overpopulation, incomplete markets, poor transpor-
tation and local management deϐicits; gone too is any 
lingering sense of state welfare. The radical (if unpre-
dictable) and life-threatening effects of global climate 
change – global climate change models are robust on 
system dynamics but weak on local predictions – is 
antithetical to the sort of predictive modeling exercis-
es practiced by the Club of Rome four decades earlier. 
The old modes of calculation – the insurance-based 
logic of calculable risks assessed through probabili-
ties – are replaced with modalities that can still ren-
der the uncertain future thinkable, an imaginary that 
can be prepared for, pre-empted, remediated. It is at 
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this point that culture – especially institutions, many 
of which are indigenous or hybrids of local custom 
and post-colonial development institutions – meets 
up with resilience and theories of complex adaptive 
systems. Its function is to incorporate social and eco-
nomic systems in an overarching complex science 
of ‘socio-ecological resilience’ rooted in civil soci-
ety (Adger et al. 2009; Holling 1986, 2001; Folke et al. 
2005). Local knowledge and practice, notions of vul-
nerability and exposure have been grafted onto a new 
turbo-charged systems  theory, derived in particular 
from the work of ecologist C.S. Holling (1973) and his 
associates, and have been brought together in a highly 
inϐluential think tank called the Stockholm Resilience 
Center. Resilience is a risk-management tool – adap-
tive co-management is the term of art – for African 
development (Mitchell and Harriss 2012) and for a 
vulnerable and crisis-prone Sahel crisis (see Gubbels 
2011). African communities can now be ϐine-tuned, 
paradoxically building on their traditional strengths 
(for example, the social capital of village communities 
or city slums) yet supplemented by the expertise of 
development and state practitioners (Adger 2006). 
It is no accident that the operations of the humani-
tarian international – most particularly in disaster 
management, in adapting to climate change, and in 
the ϐield of famine relief – have shifted their gaze from 
vulnerability (the identiϐication of vulnerable popu-
lations and how to target them) to resilience (Grove 
2014). That is to say vulnerability is now rolled into 
a more embracing analysis of how resilient socio-eco-
logical systems function. Confronting budget cuts and 
an increase in disaster costs, the multilaterals are not 
only concerned to identify vulnerable classes – that 
is to say victims, solidarity and state assistance – but 
also self-reliance, participation and community and 
popular capacities to confront crises (Reghezza-Zitt et 
al. 2012). Resilience is propounded as a more ϐlexible 
strategy than either prevention or mitigation; it is val-
idated through the capacities of individuals, organi-
zations, households and communities to self- organize 
and adapt. The UN Ofϐice for Disaster Risk reduction 
(UNISDR) in its foundational report ‘Living with risk’ 
(2004) rescued the notion of adaptation to “hazards 
that can affect anyone, anywhere”. A policy of resil-
ience, they say, demands a consideration of almost 
every physical phenomenon on the planet. Resilience 
is nothing if it is not capacious in its remit .
The UN Resilience Framework powerfully illuminates 
the pre-requisites and normative expectations for re-
silience, understood as a set of practices and as a nor-
mative goal, to be achieved. Uncertainty is an oppor-
tunity and a challenge; it is central to life itself (to all 
living systems as the Resilience Alliance would have 
it). Exploiting the omnipresent threat of shocks per-
mits and encourages the invention of a new and better 
future, of a more adaptable, ϐlexible, robust and enter-
prising subject. It promotes the notion of managing 
one’s own risks, incubating innovation, personal re-
sponsibility and empowerment. In decentralizing au-
thority and resources to promote local-level disaster 
risk reduction, the UN demands that “citizens, includ-
ing indigenous communities and other vulnerable pop-
ulations [who] must participate, be actively informed, 
and take individual responsibility” (UNISDR 2012, em-
phasis added). Resilience training enables everyone – 
the capitalist, the poor farmer, the troubled teen, the 
military grunt – to “live freely and with conϐidence in a 
world of potential risks” (Lentzos and Rose 2009: 243). 
As Pat O’Malley (2011) puts it, in a magniϐicent turn of 
phrase, “uncertainty makes us free”.
What is so striking about the climate change-food se-
curity talk as a form of catastrophism is that the con-
cept of vulnerability is attached to the language of ad-
aptation and its cognates: adaptive capacity, adaptive 
strategies, adaptive governance. Since the ϐirst IPCC 
report in 1991, adaptation – deϐined by IPCC (2014) 
as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected 
climate and its effects” – has emerged as the lodestar 
of public and development policy coincident with the 
realization that mitigation has receded into a distant 
future. ‘Adapt now’ is the rallying cry of the moment 
(or one might say, ‘adapt or die’). Bassett and Fogelman 
(2013) show how pervasive is the adaptation lexicon 
not just within IPCC but in the citational world of key 
research journals. It is a term that has ‘gone viral’ 
(Ribot 2011). IPCC has worked with a conceptual un-
derstanding of adaptation as adjustment that actually 
harkens back to 1960s cultural ecology. The focus is on 
proximate rather than structural processes regarding 
adaptation in social systems, and on passive, reactive 
or anticipatory adjustments. In the latest IPCC report 
there is talk of climate-resilient pathways, of the “lim-
its to adaptation”, and the need for “transformational 
adaptation” (Summary, IPCC 2014: 24-25) but noth-
ing here challenges Bassett and Fogelman’s overall as-
sessment that IPCC operates with a pedestrian, and 
in many respects, old-fashioned notion of adaptation 
as “adjustment to climate stimuli” (2014: 49). Adapta-
tion’s revival and rehabilitation, after a long period in 
which it fell from grace, is seemingly not in question. 
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It constitutes a hegemonic discourse, anchored now in 
equally powerful discourses of security, risk manage-
ment and resilient social systems.
From the vantage point of the political ecology prac-
ticed by Hans-Georg Bohle, the ‘adapt now’ mentalité 
is something of a paradox (see Taylor 2015). Climate 
change adaptation and resilience work is unequivo-
cal in identifying the concept’s origins in evolution-
ary biology but it was precisely the ϐlaws of organic 
analogies that political ecology sought to address. 
Acknowledging that its deϐinition is disputed and 
semantically slippery, climate adaptation refers to 
“processes, actions or outcomes in a system in order 
for the system to better cope with, manage or adjust 
to some changing condition” (Smit and Wandel 2006: 
282). At the very least there are striking resemblances 
here to earlier research on natural hazards, and stim-
ulus-response models. What appears to be on offer is 
a recycled version of adaptation thinking of the 1960s 
associated most closely with cultural ecology, ecolog-
ical anthropology, cybernetics and systems theory. 
If the measure of adaptive ϐitness is now “success or 
survival of a culture” (Smit and Wandel 2006: 282), it 
has nevertheless been repurposed and rebooted with 
a new conceptual vocabulary: security, risk, vulner-
ability, exposure, resilience, adaptive management 
and governance (see Adger 2006; Adger et al. 2009; 
Pelling 2011; Smit and Wandel 2006). In this second 
generation adaptive theory, the properties of com-
plex systems – characterized by signaling and infor-
mation processing, complex collective behavior, non-
linearity and a “thoughtful (but perhaps not brilliant) 
[adaptive] agent” (Miller and Page 2007: 3) – assure 
“continual adaptation and the emergence of cross-
level organization” (Folke 2006: 257). Resilience 
provides both a normative and conceptual frame: 
adaptive capacity builds enhanced resilience. A four-
phase “adaptive renewal cycle” (panarchy so-called) 
undergirds a capacious model of “socio-ecological 
systems analysis” drawing within its circumference, 
according to its in-house theoreticians, all that has 
gone before (Smit and Wandel 2006; Gunderson and 
Holling 2002). And yet it was precisely the limits of 
adaptation as a form of thought which constituted the 
very ground on which political ecology and concepts 
like exposure and vulnerability emerged during the 
1970s and 1980s. Minimally one needs to ask, is this 
old wine in new bottles? How and in what ways does 
“adaptation 2.0” address the weaknesses of “adap-
tation 1.0”? And most especially how have concepts 
like vulnerability, that Hans-Georg Bohle did so much 
to develop and promote, fared in their incorporation 
into resilience theory and adaptive governance?
The origins of the political ecology of vulnerability
Political ecology and its concern with vulnerability 
emerged in the late 1970s from a critique of prevail-
ing cultural ecological and ecological analyses of 
adaptation (Rappaport 1968; Vayda and Rappaport 
1967). Its conceptual toolkit was largely drawn from 
political economy. In particular the withering as-
saults by Maurice Godelier (1972) and Jonathan Fried-
man (1974) exposed not just the mechanistic and 
often Hegelian character of much of what passed as 
adaptation theory (the idea that regulation of the 
environment was happening behind the backs of the 
actors through cultural thermostats), but the difϐi-
culty of seeing how the adaptive structure of socie-
ties could be squared with not just the clear patterns 
of ecological destruction but the questions of power, 
class, property and access which were central to oth-
er theoretical approaches, most especially Marxian 
political economy. Central to this critique was a suspi-
cion of organic analogies – subjecting social systems 
to an overriding logic of living systems or ecological 
rationality as Godelier (1972) called it – and the grave 
dangers of functionalism and a sort of inductive or 
crude materialism. Social systems seemed to operate 
like giant servo-mechanisms. As Godelier put it: “Here 
[in cultural ecology and ecological anthropology] we 
recognize empirical materialism, the ‘economism’ 
that reduces all social structures to nothing but epi-
phenomena of the economy which is itself reduced, 
through technique, to a function of adaptation to the 
environment … a materialism like this is unable to 
explain the reasons why, the fundamental necessity 
of what exists, i.e. the reasons why the history of so-
cieties that are not always completely integrated to-
talities but totalities whose unity is the provisionally 
stable effect of a structural compatibility that enables 
different structures to reproduce themselves until 
they reach the point at which internal (and external) 
dynamics of these systems forbids this totality to go 
on existing as such” (Godelier 1972: xxiv-xxv).
As a number of commentators noted, this form of 
ecological materialism was innocent of any form of 
contradiction. Sahlins said that ecologic rationali-
ties “exchange ... meaningful content for functional 
truth” (cited in Rappaport 1968/84: 308). Levi-Strauss 
(1968: 13) put it powerfully: “to say that a society 
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functions is a truism, but to say that everything in a 
society functions is an absurdity”.
Economic and cultural anthropologists and critical 
geo graphers provided a powerful critique of what 
they saw as functionalist (in their view largely de-
scriptive) analysis. Drawing inspiration from new re-
search on the political economy of peasant societies 
(in part propelled by the Vietnam war and a reconsid-
eration of peasant radicalism and politics) and on the 
role of the state in post-colonial development, a gener-
ation of political ecologists was shaped by a renewed 
interest in agrarian political economy, or the so-called 
agrarian question. Deϐined by Kautsky (1899/1988), 
the agrarian question was concerned with the ways 
in which capital was taking hold of and transforming 
agriculture. Much of this political ecology addressed 
a post-colonial rural world in the throes of what Karl 
Polanyi (1944) called the ‘great transformation’. Cen-
tral to political ecology was not systems ecology as 
such but political economy, and how it shaped or even 
produced the environments which were, or were not, 
managed by differing sorts of “land managers”. 
Rather than examining the functional adequacy of 
culture or social structure, political ecology started 
with the relation of producers to the market, the com-
modiϐication of land and labor, the forms of surplus 
extraction and the prismatic forms of social differen-
tiation with peasant communities, the breakdown of 
the moral economy, emerging forms of class structure 
and the changing relations of production3. Rather than 
seeing environmental questions through the prism of 
society and nature or human response and biophysical 
trigger, political ecology, drawing on Marxist ideas of 
the labor process and notions of ϐirst and second na-
ture, saw nature and society as dialectically constitut-
ed (Smith 1984). Environment was not some pre-given 
context, but was an object that could be construed in 
different ways by different communities and classes. 
Political ecology problematised what the environment 
meant and to whom – a central plank in Piers Blaikie’s 
(1985) work on soil erosion for example. What this 
meant was that the planetary ecosystem was con-
structed out of “the contradictory unity of capital and 
nature” ( Harvey 2014: 248), that capital is a working 
and evolving “ecological system” in which “nature 
and capital are constantly being produced and repro-
duced”. There is no transcendent adaptive or ecologi-
cal order here, but an ecological system in which capi-
tal necessarily privatizes, commodiϐies, monetizes 
and commercializes every aspect of nature. 
Political ecology constructed a theory upon a more-
or-less Marxist analysis of political economy in which 
the social relations of production, access to and con-
trol over resources, and power relations rooted in 
state and capital ϐigured centrally. The dynamics of 
speciϐic historical forms of capitalist accumulation – 
whether in the Brazilian Amazon (e.g. Susanna Hecht) 
or the Himalayan foothills (e.g. Piers Blaikie) – were 
its central starting points. Its object of critique was 
not only adaptation as such, but also a dominant Mal-
thusianism (‘population pressure’ on the environ-
ment) which the rise of ecosystem thinking did little 
to change. The birth of political ecology was, not un-
like its predecessor cultural ecology, a transnational, 
multi-sited and trans-disciplinary enterprise (though 
Geography took pride of place). There were four geo-
graphically interconnected institutional settings each 
marked by the appearance of a sort of foundational 
text focused on ϐield research in four different regions 
(Africa, Brazil, South Asia and Melanesia). What they 
all shared was a common engagement – in related but 
different ways – with the political economy of develop-
ment and what Harvey (2014: 262) calls the “mindless 
extension of capital’s ecology into our lifeworld”. Sys-
tems of access to and control over resources, growing 
commodiϐication of the resource base and social life, 
circuits of capital accumulation and the role of the 
state were absolutely central. Each of these four sites 
and their founding ϐigures – ANU (Harold Brookϔield), 
Berkeley (Susanna Hecht and immodestly myself), 
Clark University (Ben Wisner), and the University of 
East Anglia (Piers Blaikie) – questioned not just func-
tionalism and adaptation as a form of thought but 
also the cost-beneϐit and behavioralist assumptions 
of much of the hazards research construed as human 
responses and adjustments to threats and stress-
ors. Political ecology turned the ϐlashlight inward 
toward commercialization of agrarian societies, to 
how communities were being torn asunder and radi-
cally reshaped by the twin processes of globalization 
and to how the  exercise of power was indispensable 
to the understanding of the institutions of property, 
resource control and market dynamics (Watts 1983). 
The conϐluence of differing trajectories that merged to 
become political ecology not surprisingly contained a 
number of different points of intellectual departure, 
reϐlecting important analytical and institutional 
differences among its founding ϐigures. The ANU- 
Melanesia group reϐlected the sense that  Rappaport’s 
(1968) account described adaptation without evolu-
tion, or as Harold Brookϔield (1973: 155) put it: eco-
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logical function rather than sociological explanation. 
The sorts of adaptive functions imputed to pig cycles 
were not about the disposability of pigs but the re-
production of “a whole system of social relationships” 
rapidly being transformed by cattle, coffee and the ad-
vancing frontier of capital. As Clarke put it, describing 
the uplands in New Guinea, the communities were, in 
fact, at the “edge of a madhouse” (Clarke 1977: 372). 
Brookϔield himself was drawn to studying the costs of 
what he called interdependent development and the 
forms of specialization and risk associated with “the 
course of development” (Brookϔield 1973)4. In the ANU 
lineage, the death knell of adaptation was the appear-
ance of Larry Grossman’s book ‘Peasants, subsistence 
ecology and development in the highlands of Papua 
New Guinea’ (1984, and originally a 1979 ANU Ph.D. 
dissertation). Grossman identiϐied his approach as cul-
tural ecology yet his analysis saw the region through 
the lens of peasant theory and patterns of social dif-
ferentiation, that is to say capital at work. 
A similar set of developments was reϐlected in work 
that linked the Universities of Michigan and Berkeley. 
Bernard Nietschmann’s (1973) stimulating cultural 
ecological study of the Miskito communities on the 
Paciϐic coast of Nicaragua entitled ‘Between land and 
water’ proved to be a sort of limit case for cultural 
ecological analysis exposing the sorts of constric-
tions imposed by adaptation as a framework. By mak-
ing use of Marshall Sahlins’s (1972) account of Marx’s 
commodity circuit (and implicitly Karl Polanyi’s 
(1944) work on markets), Nietschmann showed how 
the central dynamics of Misikito ϐishing and subsist-
ence systems were increasingly driven by broader 
market changes, in large measure the commercializa-
tion of the turtle industry. My own 1979 dissertation 
at Michigan – which appeared as a book called ‘Silent 
violence’ (Watts 1983) when I had relocated to Berke-
ley – certainly was inϐluenced by these Polanyian in-
sights into patterns of resource use and the politics 
of “ϐictitious commodities”. But in examining the re-
lations between drought and famine in West Africa 
I made use of structural Marxism and especially the 
so-called agrarian question. It was the intersection 
of markets (the role of merchant capital), patterns 
of social inequality and climatic perturbations that 
shaped what sorts of decision peasant households 
could make in relation to manage risks like drought 
as well as why the systems of which they were part 
might collapse (i.e. famines as crises of social repro-
duction). Ben Wisner – who completed his Ph.D. in 
1977 working in eastern Africa – was exploring pre-
cisely these issues with students at Clark University, 
in a different part of the continent, as a way of upend-
ing the stimulus-response models of hazard research 
associated with the scholars at Chicago, Toronto and 
Clark itself5. It was rigorous political economy analy-
sis that demonstrated how vulnerability and margin-
ality (both ecological and socio-economic) was being 
produced by particular sorts of social and economic 
exposure rooted in the circuits of capital and in the 
operations of what passed as state policy. 
There were two other settings that proved to be foun-
dational to an emerging political ecology: one was 
Berkeley Geography, in particular Susanna Hecht’s 
work on tropical deforestation in Brazil (1985), a 
frontier of land clearance and speculation propelled 
by a powerful logic of political alliances between 
landed elites and state derived rents and subsidies. 
The other, centred in the UK at the School of De-
velopment Studies at the University of East Anglia, 
centered on Piers Blaikie and his direct engagement 
with the political economy of development. Blaikie’s 
hugely inϐluential work (1985) emerged largely, but 
not exclusively, from South Asia on the subject of 
soil erosion and land management. Again adaptation 
was not the central concern so much as the chains 
of inter-dependency linking farmers, household, 
and communities to the state and the world market 
which shaped – and often undermined – the capacity 
to manage the land and soil resources.
None of this should infer a common theoretical point 
of reference among those political ecologists for 
whom adaptation seemed to confer a set of analytical 
blinders. For example, Blaikie and Brookϔield were a 
mix of world systems theory, dependencia, and a very 
broadly deϐined (and not unequivocally Marxist) po-
litical economy. My own work drew heavily on Althus-
serian Marxism and the work of Karl Kautsky; Larry 
Grossman’s book reϐlected the inϐluence of peasant 
studies; Hecht’s initial research on Brazil was shaped 
by Latin American theories of the state and rent seek-
ing. Subsequent pathbreaking work – one thinks of 
Nancy Peluso’s (1992) research on Indonesian for-
ests – drew on social historians like E.P. Thompson as 
much as theories of the post-colonial state or of the 
peasantry. What they all shared, I think, was a com-
mon focus on patterns of accumulation, access to and 
control over resources, and changing class structure; 
political ecology could demonstrate that some indi-
viduals and households were rendered marginal (to 
their resource base) and made vulnerable to antici-
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pated and unanticipated environmental processes in 
new ways. Small farmers might be degrading their 
environment because they had no choice (they were 
subject to a simple reproduction squeeze; see Watts 
1983); forests were destroyed in a desperate attempt 
to establish property rights in areas where the rule of 
law was lacking; peasants worked harder and longer, 
often degrading their land, in order to ensure social 
reproduction in the face of price squeezes. In short, 
this political ecology had as its reference point what 
I would call regimes of accumulation, operating at a 
multiplicity of scales and through complex chains of 
causation, providing structures of opportunity and 
constraint – imposed by social relations of production 
and exchange and by property relations – that shaped 
how resources, environments and perturbations 
might be managed and governed.
As a constellation of ideas and approaches, political 
ecology became, not surprisingly, something of a mov-
ing frontier. By the 1990s this ϐirst generation politi-
cal ecology had been broadened in two ways: to put 
it crudely, to Marx and regimes of accumulation were 
added Foucault and regimes of truth (Forsyth 2003; Li 
2007), and Gramsci and regimes of rule or hegemony 
(Moore 2005). The new palette was partly a result of 
changing intellectual fashion (the growing inϐluence 
of forms of post-structuralism), partly a function of 
cross-fertilization with other ϐields (science studies, 
race theory, environmental history, green justice), 
partly a function of the interest of deploying politi-
cal ecology in First World, industrial and advanced 
capitalist settings (rather than the world of peasants), 
and not least because of the blind spots and silences 
within Marxian political economy. Political ecology 
had been relatively silent on the forms and dynamics 
of political contention surrounding the environment 
(see Peluso 1992). Environmental movements, the role 
of civil society and later armed struggle (militants 
struggles over forest or oil) pushed political ecology 
to expand and deepen its understandings of the opera-
tions of power. No surprise then that the knowledge-
power-institutions nexus, drawing especially from 
post-structural and discourse analysis, was taken up 
quickly. Careful examination of forms of environmen-
tal expertise, such as how institutions like the World 
Bank were “greened”, how conventional models of en-
vironmental degradation (e.g., the tragedy of the com-
mons) constructed referent objects in particular ways 
with consequences for policy, and especially a focus on 
forms of green governance – for example understand-
ing the effects of decentralized governance on forest 
regulation or common property institutions, and the 
politics of differing management regimes – all became 
central to political ecology in the 1990s which shaped 
Hans-Georg Bohle’s work (see Watts 2000 for review).
Resilience, complex adaptive systems
and the market
Adaptation as a form of thought never really disap-
peared of course, any more than systems or evolu-
tionary theory lost its appeal in the social sciences 
with the rise of political ecology. Quite the contrary, 
over the past two decades, adaptation has returned 
arguably more robust than ever, attached now to the 
risks of global climate change and indeed to global 
threats of virtually all sorts (see Floyd 2010). Re-
tooled and re-purposed, adaptation and adaptive 
governance are put to the service of a new frame-
work, designed to assist in the construction of resil-
ient social systems (Folke 2006). Adaptive capacity 
is, as some of its foremost theoreticians put it, “a 
core feature of resilient socio-ecological systems” 
(Nelson et al. 2007: 395). In place of the managed 
environmentalism or neo-Malthusian models of the 
1960s and 1970s is a new-fangled language of resil-
iency, adaptive community institutions and market 
governance (see WRI 2008). Radical uncertainties 
about the effects of global climate change – global 
climate change models are robust on system dy-
namics but weaker on regional and local predic-
tions – are the harsh realities to which adaptive and 
resilient systems are to be made to speak. 
It is at this point that governance and institutions 
meet up with theories of ‘complex adaptive systems’ 
(CAS) (see Miller and Page 2007) designed to incorpo-
rate social and economic systems into an overarch-
ing science of “socio-ecological resilience” ( Adger et 
al. 2009; Holling 1986, 2001; Folke et al. 2005). Local 
knowledge and practice, notions of vulnerability and 
exposure – in other words the conceptual armory of 
political ecology – have been grafted onto this new 
turbo-charged systems theory, derived in particular 
from the work of ecologist C.S. Holling (1973), and 
brought together in a highly inϐluential think tank 
called the Stockholm Resilience Center. Resilience is a 
risk-management tool for the sorts of communities – 
whether in New Orleans or Lagos or rural Papua – 
that political ecology saw as under threat or now con-
fronting radical ecological change (or for that matter 
global terrorism, biosecurity, or ϐinancial crises). 
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In so far as resilient systems embody adaptive capac-
ity, then to the same extent resilience is understood 
as the amount of change a system can undergo while 
retaining “the same controls on function and struc-
ture” (Nelson et al. 2007: 398) through self-organi-
zation, capacity for learning and capacity to absorb 
change. In resilience talk, adaptation is always cou-
pled with a set of afϐine terms – vulnerability, capac-
ity and exposure – while being embedded in larger 
socio- ecological, living, self-organizing complex sys-
tems (see Ribot 2014). All of this is then harnessed to 
governance – adaptive governance is the moniker – 
which links self-organization to particular sorts of 
environmental problems (ecosystem restoration in 
the Everglades or water catchment systems in  Kenya). 
Adaptation to drought in Nigeria would involve ad-
justments (switching occupations say) and resilience 
(social networks). The governance of drought related 
issues involve “building knowledge”, “networking” 
and “leadership” (Olsson et al. 2006). Not unusually, 
much of this adaptation and resiliency is draped in 
the language of community empowerment, adaptive 
management, community regulation and insurance 
using market mechanisms. The notion of adaptive 
capacity with respect to climate change, for example, 
relies upon a substantial body of research which dem-
onstrates, for example, how rural communities in Af-
rica (and elsewhere) adapt to climate change through 
mobility, storage, diversiϐication, communal pooling, 
and exchange by drawing on social networks and 
their access to resources (Adger et al. 2009; Agrawal 
and Perrin 2009). 
But it is not clear whether the talk of adaptive strate-
gies and networking as ways of framing vulnerabil-
ity is consistent with the broader theoretical ideas 
developed by Bohle in his notion of vulnerability 
as a social space. It is one thing to say that “vulner-
ability is driven by inadvertent or deliberate human 
action that reinforces self-interest and the distribu-
tion of power in addition to interacting with physical 
and ecological systems” (Adger 2006: 270) but quite 
another to move from indicators of exposure to a 
causal structure of vulnerability and a robust theo-
ry of power and circuits of capital. Political ecology, 
after all, in its account of vulnerability emphasized 
structures of domination; the community was seen 
as a theatre that had no simple unity, coherence or 
equality, but was one in which power was contested 
and fought over, often violently. In these communities 
nature is internalized within the circulation and ac-
cumulation of capital. All of this – to say nothing of 
a broader grounding in social theory – is strikingly 
absent from the new adaptation studies. Rather what 
is on offer instead is a bland and bloodless shopping 
list of “conditions” for adaptive governance, includ-
ing “policy will,” “coordination of stakeholders,” “sci-
ence,” “common goals” and “creativity.” A canonical 
policy statement like ‘Roots of resilience’ (2005) pro-
poses to scale up “nature based income and culturing 
resilience”, which require ownership, capacity and 
connection. Ecosystem-based enterprises, rooted in 
community resource management, will entail local-
state and private-civic partnerships and enterprise 
networking (see Reid 2010; Grove 2014a). But as 
 Evans and Reid (2014) point out, the human subject 
in this account is resilient to the degree she adapts 
to rather than resists: “To be resilient is to forego the 
very power of resistance” (Evans and Reid 2014: 81).
Climate adaptation is now embedded within a view of 
life understood as a living and complex adaptive sys-
tem characterized by self-organization, non-linear, 
combinatorial transactions and radical contingency. 
Adaptation can only be meaningfully performed 
through contingency, which is to say through the con-
duct of shaping our exposure to, and creative exploi-
tation of, contingent events and processes in nature 
and from the “independent actions and interventions 
of biological being itself“ (Dillon 2008: 315). Contin-
gency and transformation are the modalities of safety 
and survival, or more properly: qualitative change in 
the nature of the living thing itself is the condition 
of possibility of security. Adaptation and resilience 
cannot be achieved solely by actuarial logic alone but 
are governed by an anticipatory logic: it seeks not to 
forestall through calculation but “to incorporate the 
very unknowability and profound uncertainty of the 
future into imminent decision” (Amoore 2013: 9). 
Irrespective of its speciϐic referent object (drought, 
youth, ϐinance), the deϐining quality of virtually all 
resilience thinking, at least in the social and socio-
ecological sciences, is a robust relationship to sys-
temic durability, ϐlexibility and to a culture of prepar-
edness, preemption and precaution (Anderson 2010). 
But as Dillon and Reid note of contemporary liberal 
rule, resilience’s reference point is all of life itself, and 
the practices required to “pre-empt the emergence of 
life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to 
life” (2009: 87; see Dillon 2007). Resilience is in the 
business of forming governable subjects, a technol-
ogy that, as Neocleous (2013: 4) observes, facilitates 
the connection between state bureaucracy and politi-
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cal imagination. It is, he says, “nothing less than the 
attempted colonization of the political imagination 
by the state” (Neocleous 2013: 4). In sum,, resilience 
provides a powerful anticipatory calculus, one of a ϐlo-
tilla of technologies associated with a security assem-
blage, rooted in a full-spectrum, and in some respects 
paranoid, social imaginary – a hyper-dangerous and 
threatening future. It is to this world of possibilistic 
logic that climate adaptation must speak (Reid 2010). 
Climate adaptation and resilience, while they enroll 
concepts like vulnerability and exposure, are text-
book illustrations of biopolitics understood as the ad-
ministration and regulation of life processes (Lemke 
2011), drawing, however, upon a distinctively modern 
theory of life as a complex adaptive system. Resilience, 
as it has emerged as a set of practices deployed by 
state and civil society groups, forms the basis for ad-
dressing the uncertainties and instabilities not simply 
of nature, but of contemporary capitalism, as well as 
the national security state, and it does so by endors-
ing a distinctive form of biopolitics and technologies 
of the self. Building resilient systems draws upon the 
adaptive and self-organizing capacities of the market 
above all else; resilience dissolves directly into neo-
liberalism understood as a way of life (Foucault 2008). 
At the time that Holling was laying out his ϐirst ide-
as, Friedrich Hayek delivered his Nobel Prize speech 
which, as Walker and Cooper (2011) brilliantly show, 
has an elective afϐinity with Holling’s ideas. Hayek was 
moving toward his mature theorization of capitalism 
as an exemplar of the biological sciences: the extend-
ed market order is “perfectly natural … like biological 
phenomena, evolved in the course of natural selection” 
(Hayek 1974, cited in Walker and Cooper 2011: 158). 
In his Nobel lecture, he returned to the epistemology 
of limited knowledge and uncertain future, a position 
which led him to explicitly reject and denounce the 
Club of Rome Limits to Growth report. It was to bio-
logical systems and complex, adaptive and nonlinear 
dynamics that he turned to provide the guide for his 
“spontaneous market order” of capitalism.
The instantiation of resilience thinking as a form of 
risk management for climate change in Africa is part 
of a larger set of technologies devoted to “human 
security”. Climate change becomes a market oppor-
tunity and source of proϐit by making contingency a 
fungible commodity; resilience is a means by which 
exposure to various contingencies is not just a refer-
ent object but a form of commodiϐication (O’Malley 
2010). Risks multiply and circulate; they are mon-
etized and securitised in a veritable avalanche of 
forms and norms. Building African resiliency in 
drought prone regions is in profound ways a sort of 
Hayekian project: how a spontaneous market order 
will be built from and out of individual and commu-
nity self-making and self-regulation through means 
of calculation and commodiϐication. The details of 
this construction will be shaped, in the case of the 
Sahel, by the peculiar exposure to the necessary and 
unavoidable contingencies of life confronted by poor 
peasants, slum dwellers and pastoralists across the 
region. This Hayekian universe of resilience as a way 
of life is a world of shocks, tipping points, thresholds, 
and possibly extinction. Resilience frames vulner-
ability through a calculative metric appropriate for 
a brave new world of turbulent capitalism and the 
global neoliberal order. It is a new ecology of rule. 
 Africa’s bottom billion provides a laboratory in which 
the poor will, in this regard, be put to the test: in the 
Sahel, the test of new and unpredictable turbulences 
residing at the intersection of global climate change 
and neoliberal capitalism. On my read this sort of 
analysis seems very far removed from the sort of in-
sight offered by Hans-Georg Bohle when he argued for 
“contested entitlements and politicized livelihoods 
in violent contexts”. His form of political ecology was 
deeply sensitive to the ways in which power oper-
ated and how this social ϐield of contestation in and 
around forms of livelihood was always rooted in the 
complexities of political economy operating at multi-
ple scales through differentiated practice (see Béné 
et al. 2012; Cote and Nightingale 2012; MacKinnon and 
Derickson 2013). Vulnerability as a complex social 
space constituted through geographically and his-
torically speciϐic networks of entitlement and power 
relation seems to be resilience theory’s blindspot. It 
is precisely this dialectical relation between social 
theory and political economy which seems absent 
in the often anodyne and bland accounts of building 
resilient communities, drought-prooϐing rural liveli-
hoods and new forms of adaptive governance.
Notes 
1 This essay is dedicated to my friend Hans-Georg Bohle 
with whom I had the great pleasure and privilege of work-
ing. Some of the ideas in the paper are developed in: Now 
and then: the origins of political ecology and the rebirth 
of adaptation as a form of thought. – In: Perreault, Tom,
Gavin Bridge and James McCarthy (eds.) 2015: The Rout-
ledge handbook of political ecology. – London: 19-49
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2 The various, and often contested, meanings of resilience 
across social, ecological, engineering and medical scientiϐic 
ϐields cannot be covered here (see Martin-Breen and Anderies 
2011 for a review, and also Bahadur et al. 2010; Folke 2006 
has a review of more recent resiliency theory). In brief one 
can gloss this vast literature by saying that in engineering 
or ‘disease’ resilience (returning to normal in the wake of a 
stress), social psychological (individual and group responses 
to adversity), sociological (collective and structural aspects 
of coping with stress), and ecological (complex adaptive liv-
ing systems). There is considerable debate and ambiguity 
over the question of whether resilience is a state, a capacity 
or a condition and how, whether resilience inheres in indi-
viduals, communities and institutions and whether it refers 
to short- or long-term responses. Typologies of resilience and 
shopping lists of resilience properties abound (see Brand and 
Jax 2007 and Béné et al. 2013; also Bahadur et al. 2010).
3 For fuller accounts of the history and development of the 
ϐield see Robbins 2004, Watts and Peet (2004).
4 Brookϔield teamed up subsequently with Piers Blaikie to or-
ganize the important political ecological text ‘Land degra-
dation and society’ (1987).
5 Much of the political ecology work on hazards and dis-
asters was pulled together in Blaikie et al. 1994. Wisner’s 
critical approach was very much shaped by the Marxist-in-
spired critical development debates in Dar es Salaam and 
Nairobi during the 1970s. 
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